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CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATIONS AND
THEIR EFFECT ON SUBSEQUENT
MILITARY PROSECUTIONS
Michael J. Davidson*
INTRODUCTION
The conduct of the American armed forces is frequently the
object of congressional investigations and hearings. Indeed,
Congress’s first investigation, conducted in 1792, inquired into the
military defeat of Major General Arthur St. Clair’s expedition
against Indian tribes of the Northwest Territories.1 More recently,
senior military officers have testified about the mistreatment of
detainees at the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq.2 Judge Advocates3 have
* B.S., 1982, United States Military Academy; J.D., 1988, College of
William & Mary; LL.M. (Military Law), 1994, The Judge Advocate General’s
School; LL.M. (Government Procurement Law), 1998, George Washington
University Law School. The author is a retired Army officer, candidate for the
Doctor of Juridical Science (S.J.D.) degree at George Washington University
School of Law, and an attorney with the federal government. This article was
written in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the S.J.D. degree. The
opinions contained herein are those of the author and do not represent the
position of any federal agency.
1
Richard J. Leon, Congressional Investigations: Are Partisan Politics
Undermining Our Vital Institutions?, 31 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 825, 826 (1998).
Largely untrained, St. Clair’s troops “blundered into an Indian attack,” causing
much of the force to flee and abandon their wounded “to the scalping knife.”
RUSSELL F. WEIGLEY, HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY 91-92 (1967). St.
Clair’s expedition suffered 632 soldiers killed in action. Id. at 92.
2
Press Release, U.S. House of Representatives, Comm. On Armed
Services, Statement by Chairman Hunter, Hearings on Abu Ghraib: The
Schlesinger Report; and the Kern, Fay, and Jones Report (Sept. 9, 2004) (“We
also heard from three general officers, General Paul Kern, Lieutenant General
Anthony Jones, and Major General George Fay, who lent their experience to yet
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attempted to obtain testimony given before congressional
committees for use at a court-martial, a practice that dates back to
at least 1879.4
Congressional investigations and hearings provide an effective
means for Senators and Representatives to gather information
necessary to perform their legislative duties. Further, public
hearings provide Congress with the opportunity to inform the
public about matters of national interest. Unfortunately,
congressional investigations and hearings can interfere with the
criminal justice system, especially when Congress grants a witness
use immunity and that witness’s testimony is either televised or
widely reported by the media. This power can be exploited by
participating Members of Congress who do not have such laudable
motives.5
another exhaustive examination of what went wrong with military detainee
operations in Iraq.”). See also Josh White & Bradley Graham, Senators Question
Absence of Blame in Abuse Report, WASH. POST, Mar. 11, 2005, at A17
(reporting on testimony of Vice Admiral Church III before the Senate Armed
Services Committee); Rowan Scarborough, Abizaid Blames ‘Broken’ System To
Report Abuse, WASH. TIMES, May 20, 2004, at A20 (reporting on hearings
before the Senate Armed Services Committee); Stephen Dinian, Abuse In Iraq
Not Military Policy, WASH. TIMES, May 12, 2004, at A01 (reporting that Army
Major General Antonio Taguba and Air Force Lieutenant General Lance Smith
testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee).
3
A “judge advocate” is defined by statute as “(A) an officer of the Judge
Advocate General’s Corps of the Army or the Navy; (B) an officer of the Air
Force or the Marine Corps who is designated as a judge advocate; or (C) an
officer of the Coast Guard who is designated as a law specialist.” 10 U.S.C. §
801(13) (2000).
4
United States v. Calley, 46 C.M.R. 1131, 1187 n.22 (A.C.M.R. 1973),
aff’d, 48 C.M.R. 19, 22 U.S.C.M.A. 534 (C.M.A. 1973) (“One of the earliest
attempts to secure testimony given to a congressional committee was made by
the judge advocate of a court-martial in 1879.”). A court-martial is a “military
court, convened . . . for trying and punishing offenses in violation of the
Uniform Code of Military Justice committed by persons subject to the Code,
particularly members of the armed forces.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 354 (6th
ed. 1979).
5
See Leon, supra note 1, at 827-28 (asserting generally that a
congressional investigation “is a delicate balancing act between a search for
truth and the exercise of political power for policy and partisan advantage” and
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The impact of congressional investigations and hearings can be
disastrous for subsequent or parallel criminal prosecutions,
including those conducted by the military. The post-My Lai courtmartial of Staff Sergeant David Mitchell6 serves as one historical
case in point. Congressional grants of immunity can also make it
extremely difficult to bring a subsequent criminal case against an
immunized witness, as exemplified by the failed federal
prosecutions of Vice Admiral John Poindexter and Lieutenant
Colonel Oliver North following the Iran-Contra scandal.7 These
situations demonstrate that in future cases, congressional
investigations and hearings may interfere with the normal progress
of the military justice system and may ultimately result in the
guilty going unpunished and justice being left undone.
This article provides a general overview of Congress’s
investigative powers and the limits on those powers, including the
rights afforded to witnesses who are called to participate in a
congressional investigation or hearing. Focusing on the military,
and using the My Lai massacre and the Iran-Contra scandal as
historical examples, this article discusses the impact of a
noting specifically that when the Republicans took control of the Senate and
House in 1995, many Republicans wanted “payback” for the excesses of
previously Democratic controlled congressional investigations). See also
GENERAL (RET.) TOMMY FRANKS, AMERICAN SOLDIER 224 (2004) (“But as I
knew from my days as ARCENT commander and my brief tenure as
CENTCOM CINC, public congressional hearings had more to do with politics
than with exposing facts.”); MERLE MILLER, PLAIN SPEAKING: AN ORAL
BIOGRAPHY OF HARRY S. TRUMAN 173-74 (1974) (noting how Congressman
Gene Cox, on the eve of WWII, wanted to establish a committee to investigate
national defense programs in order to “embarrass [President] Roosevelt” and
explaining how the Committee on the Conduct of the War, during the Civil War,
“wanted to cause trouble for Lincoln, which they succeeded in doing”).
6
Sergeant Mitchell’s court-martial was one of several pursued by the Army
following the 1968 massacre of the Vietnamese inhabitants of the hamlet of My
Lai, Republic of South Vietnam. See infra notes 123-28 and accompanying text.
7
The Iran-Contra scandal refers to the illegal diversion of money, from the
sale of anti-tank missiles to Iran as part of an effort to release American hostages
held in Lebanon, to support the Nicaraguan Contra movement. Four individuals
associated with the military were prosecuted as a result of their involvement in
this diversion of funds. See infra notes 192-93 and accompanying text.
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congressional investigation on the government’s current ability to
prosecute members of the armed forces.
Part I provides an overview of Congress’s broad power to
conduct investigations and hearings, and the tools it may use to
secure testimony and evidence. This section also discusses the
limits of Congress’s investigative powers, including the rights of
witnesses appearing before Congress. Part II addresses a
prosecutor’s disclosure obligations under the Jencks Act, as
mandated by federal case law, and as required by military law.
Further, this portion of the article discusses the relationship
between these disclosure obligations and evidence acquired by
Congressional investigations. Part III discusses Congress’s
authority to grant immunity during an investigation and the effect
of such grant on ongoing and future criminal prosecutions. Part IV
examines the current status of common law privileges after a
compelled waiver during a congressional investigation.
I. OVERVIEW OF THE CONDUCT OF CONGRESSIONAL
INVESTIGATIONS AND HEARINGS
In order to fully appreciate the potential impact of a
congressional investigation or hearing on the military justice
system, an overview of Congress’s investigative powers and
limitations is necessary.
A. Inherent Authority and General Limitations
Congress’s power to investigate is not enumerated in the
Constitution. Rather, the Supreme Court has found that power to
be “inherent in the legislative process.”8 That such power exists is
8

Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 187 (1957). See also Leon, supra
note 1, at 826-27 (“[T]he power of Congress to investigate is not a power that
was written into the Constitution by our founding fathers. It is a power that the
Supreme Court has nonetheless recognized for over 100 years as a power
inherent to the legislative and oversight functions of the Congress.”). In Watkins,
the Court reversed a contempt of Congress conviction of a witness who had
refused to answer questions posed by the Subcommittee of Un-American
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based on the rationale that a “legislative body cannot legislate
wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting the
conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or change.”9
The Supreme Court has broadly defined this power to include
“inquiries concerning the administration of existing laws as well as
proposed or possibly needed statutes[,] . . . and surveys of defects
in our social, economical or political system for the purpose of
enabling the Congress to remedy them.”10 Additionally, this power
to investigate “comprehends probes into departments of the
Federal Government to expose corruption, inefficiency or waste.”11
As long as the subject matter of the investigation falls within the
broad ambit of Congress’s investigative authority, the courts will
not examine the actual motives of investigating committee
members.12
As a function of its investigative authority, Congress, or a
committee acting on its behalf, “may depose witnesses, issue
subpoenas, and hold hearings.”13 When called upon to review the
Activities Committee, determining that upon the defendant witness’s objection
to the pertinency of the questions, the committee chairman failed to provide a
meaningful explanation. 354 U.S. at 214-15. The failure to explain the
pertinency of the committee’s questions did not provide defendant with “a fair
opportunity to determine whether he was within his rights in refusing to answer
and his conviction [was] necessarily invalid under the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment.” Id. at 215.
9
Eastland v. U.S. Servicemen’s Fund, Inc., 421 U.S. 491, 504 (1975)
(quoting McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 175 (1927)).
10
Watkins, 354 U.S. at 187.
11
Id.
12
Id. at 200. See also Eastland, 421 U.S. at 508 (“Our cases make clear
that in determining the legitimacy of a congressional act we do not look to the
motives alleged to have prompted it.”); United States v. Hintz, 193 F. Supp. 325,
334 (N.D. Ill. 1961) (“[N]o court can proscribe Congressional inquiries merely
because they are alleged to involve . . . improper impelling motives . . . .”);
United States v. Icardi, 140 F. Supp. 383, 388 (D.D.C. 1956) (“[C]ourts will not
question the motives of the questioners.”).
13
Roberto Iraola, Self-Incrimination and Congressional Hearings, 54
MERCER L. REV. 939, 949 (2003). See also Eastland, 421 U.S. at 504-05
(involving Congress’s power to issue subpoenas); United States v. Di Carlo, 102
F. Supp. 597, 601 (N.D. Ohio 1952) (involving Congress’s “power to conduct
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propriety of a subpoena, the court’s scope of inquiry is limited to
“determining that a committee’s inquiry may fairly be deemed
within its province.”14 Further, the manner in which Congress
elects to conduct its hearings, whether “public or private, and who
shall be admitted or invited, are questions committed to the
Congress . . . .”15 This congressional discretion also extends to the
decision whether or not to permit televised hearings.16
Although Congress’s power to investigate is broad, the courts
have cautioned that it is not unlimited.17 Congressional
investigations “must be related to, and in furtherance of, a
legitimate task of the Congress.”18 Congress may not conduct
hearings merely to punish those being investigated, to facilitate the
“personal aggrandizement of the investigators,” or to delve into the
private affairs of an individual “without justification in terms of the
functions of the Congress.”19 As the Supreme Court in Watkins v.
United States posited, “there is no congressional power to expose
for the sake of exposure.”20 Further, the authority of an
investigating committee or subcommittee is limited to the authority
delegated to it by Congress.21
investigations” and “compel disclosures of facts pertinent to the inquiry”).
14
Eastland, 421 U.S. at 506 (quoting Tenney v. Bradnove, 341 U.S. 367,
378 (1951)).
15
Hintz, 193 F. Supp. at 335.
16
See id. (stating that witnesses have no right to refuse to testify because of
presence of media); Application of U.S. Senate Select Comm. on Presidential
Campaign Activities, 361 F. Supp. 1270, 1279-80 (D.D.C. 1973) (holding that
the court lacks power to restrict immunity order to testify upon condition that
“the witnesses . . . testify only outside the presence of television cameras and
radio microphones”).
17
Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 187 (1957). See also Barenblatt
v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 111 (1959) (“Broad as it is, the power [of
inquiry] is not, however, without limitations.”).
18
Watkins, 354 U.S. at 187.
19
Id. See McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 173 (1927) (“[N]either
house is invested with ‘general’ power to inquire into private affairs . . . .”).
20
Watkins, 354 U.S. at 200.
21
Id. at 206 (“[T]hese committees are restricted to the missions delegated
to them, i.e., to acquire certain data to be used by the House or the Senate in
coping with a problem that falls within its legislative sphere.”).
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Congressional inquiries are also limited by constitutional
constraints. Witnesses appearing before Congress enjoy the same
constitutional rights as witnesses appearing in any court of law.22
Congress must respect the First Amendment rights of speech,
press, religion, political beliefs, and association; it cannot subject a
witness to unreasonable searches and seizure in violation of the
Fourth Amendment; and Congress cannot force a witness to
incriminate himself in violation of the Fifth Amendment.23
To effectuate its investigative authority, Congress may exercise
its contempt power. This power “is the means by which Congress
responds to certain acts which obstruct the legislative process in
order to punish the contemnor and/or to remove the obstruction.”24
Congress may exercise its contempt power in three different
proceedings. First, both the House and Senate possess the inherent
power to cite a witness for contempt. Under this procedure, the
Sergeant-at-Arms brings the person before the House or Senate,
where he or she is tried, and then, if appropriate, imprisoned in the
Capitol jail.25 The length of imprisonment is dependent upon the
purpose of the incarceration. As punishment, the person can be
imprisoned for a fixed period of time; as a compliance measure,
the person can only be imprisoned until compliance is achieved,
but not longer than the end of the congressional session for
purposes of the House.26 Although available to Congress, this
process has not been used in more than half a century.27

22

Id. at 188 (“[T]he constitutional rights of witnesses will be respected by
the Congress as they are in a court of justice. The Bill of Rights is applicable to
investigations as to all forms of governmental action.”).
23
Id.
24
JAY R. SHAMPANSKY, CONGRESS’ CONTEMPT POWER 1 (2003).
25
Id. at 2 n.4.
26
Id. Incarceration in the Capitol jail may be challenged in court through a
writ of habeas corpus. Id. See also In the Matter of the Application of the U.S.
Senate Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations, 655 F.2d 1232, 1238 n.27 (D.C.
Cir. 1981).
27
SHAMPANSKY, supra note 24, at x. The process is “considered to be
cumbersome and time-consuming for a modern Congress with a heavy
legislative workload that would be interrupted by a trial at the bar.” Id. at x.
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Second, the Senate possesses a civil contempt power.28 Enacted
as part of the Ethics in Government Act of 1978,29 the Senate’s
civil contempt power envisions a process in which the Senate
Legal Counsel applies to the U.S. District Court for the District of
Columbia for an order to adhere to a Senate subpoena, after being
directed to do so by Senate resolution.30 Refusal to comply with a
valid subpoena may result in a summary proceeding for contempt
of court and the imposition of sanctions to achieve compliance.31
This civil contempt procedure, which does not apply to the
House,32 was designed to remedy a perceived shortcoming in
Congress’s existing contempt power, which did not allow “a
witness to challenge judicially the legality of the inquiry or
procedures, and then to purge himself of his contempt by testifying
if his contentions were not judicially upheld.”33 The civil contempt
process, however, does not apply “to an officer or employee of the
executive branch of the Federal Government acting within his or
her official capacity,” unless “the refusal to comply is based on the
assertion of a personal privilege or objection” rather than an
authorized invocation of a governmental privilege or objection.34
Finally, both the House and Senate may use the criminal
contempt procedures codified at sections 192 and 194 of Title 2 of
the United States Code. Originally enacted in 1857, section 192
makes it a misdemeanor offense, punishable by a fine not to
exceed $1,000 and imprisonment for a period not to exceed twelve
months, for any person summoned to testify or produce papers by
28

2 U.S.C. §§ 288b, 288d (2005); 28 U.S.C. § 1365 (2005).
SHAMPANSKY, supra note 24, at 19 n.2 (citing Ethics in Government Act
of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-521, §§ 703, 705, 92 Stat. 1877-80 (1978)).
30
Id. at 19-20. See also 2 U.S.C. §§ 288b(b), 288d(a) (2005); 28 U.S.C. §
1365(a) (2005). Alternatively, the Senate may elect to first seek a judicial
declaration as to the validity of the Senate subpoena or order. SHAMPANSKY,
supra note 24, at 20 n.5; 2 U.S.C. § 288d(a) (2005).
31
SHAMPANSKY, supra note 24, at 20. See also 28 U.S.C. § 1365(b) (2005).
32
In the Matter of the Application of the United States Senate Permanent
Subcomm. on Investigations, 655 F.2d 1232, 1238 n.28 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
33
Id. at 1238 (quoting United States v. Fort, 443 F.2d 670, 677 (D.C.
Cir.1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 932 (1971)) (internal quotations omitted).
34
28 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (West 2004).
29
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either House of Congress, who “willfully makes default, or who,
having appeared, refuses to answer any question pertinent to the
question under inquiry . . . .”35 Section 194 establishes the
procedures to bring the matter to the appropriate United States
Attorney, “whose duty it shall be to bring the matter before the
grand jury for its action.”36 However, it is unclear whether this
duty is mandatory or discretionary and whether the U.S. Attorney
may exercise its prosecutorial discretion and elect not to pursue a
prosecution.37
B. Witness Rights
In terms of witness rights, there are some similarities between a
Congressional investigation or hearing and a criminal trial. Like
the criminal defendant, a witness appearing before a congressional
committee may appear with counsel,38 although the counsel’s role
may be a limited one.39 Indeed, counsel may appear with the
35

2 U.S.C. § 192; SHAMPANSKY, supra note 24, at 6. The original
legislation was in response to the refusal of a newspaper reporter to answer
various questions posed by a select committee. Id. at 13 n.1.
36
2 U.S.C. § 194 (West 1997 and 2004 Supp.). The procedures require:
(1) approval by the committee [or subcommittee if appropriate], (2)
calling up and reading the committee report on the floor; (3) either (if
Congress is in session) House [or Senate] approval of the resolution
authorizing the Speaker [or President of the Senate] to certify the report
to the U.S. Attorney for prosecution, or (if Congress is not in session)
an independent determination by the Speaker [or President of the
Senate] to certify the report, [and] (4) certification by the Speaker [or
President of the Senate] to the appropriate U.S. Attorney for
prosecution.
SHAMPANSKY, supra note 24, at 14-15.
37
SHAMPANSKY, supra note 24, at 16-17.
38
See, e.g., Susan Schmidt, Ex-Lobbyist Is Assailed At Hearing, WASH.
POST, Sept. 30, 2004, at A4 (describing how witnesses to a Senate Indian Affairs
Committee hearing appeared with legal counsel); OLIVER L. NORTH & WILLIAM
NOVAK, UNDER FIRE: AN AMERICAN STORY 361 (1991) (stating that during his
testimony before a select committee during the Iran-Contra hearings, North
frequently consulted with his attorney).
39
See Robert J. Giuffra, Representing Your Client In a Congressional
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witness at all stages of a congressional investigation.40 The
unrestricted right to the presence of counsel throughout the entire
investigative process is similar to the rights afforded a military
defendant in the military justice system, which generally offers
more procedural protections than does its federal counterpart.41
A witness appearing before a congressional committee also has
the right to invoke the Fifth Amendment right against selfincrimination and refuse to answer questions or provide
evidence.42 At least one court has extended a witness’s right to
invoke the Fifth Amendment in response to questions posed during
Investigation, 4 BUS. CRIMES BULL.: COMPLIANCE & LITIG. 1 (Dec. 1997),
available at 4 No. 11 BUSCRIMB 1 (Westlaw), at *3 (“The witness’s counsel
normally is a potted plant during the hearings; the active participation of Oliver
North’s counsel, Brendan Sullivan, during the Iran-Contra hearings was a very
rare exception to this rule. Don’t expect to be able to raise objections to the
form—or even to the relevance—of questions.”).
40
See id. at *2 (“[A] witness’s lawyer can attend a deposition or interview
conducted by congressional staff.”).
41
In the federal system, counsel may not accompany his or her client
during an appearance before the grand jury. SUSAN W. BRENNER & GREGORY G.
LOCKHART, FEDERAL GRAND JURY: A GUIDE TO LAW AND PRACTICE § 13.9, at
370 (1996 & 1999 Supp.). To consult with an attorney, the witness must first
leave the grand jury room. Id. In contrast, an “accused” (military defendant)
may attend the entire Article 32 hearing—the military’s equivalent of the grand
jury—with counsel, present witnesses and evidence, and cross-examine all
witnesses. Rule for Courts-Martial 405(f), Manual for Courts-Martial, United
States (2002 ed.) [hereinafter MCM].
42
Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 188 (1957) (“Witnesses cannot
be compelled to give evidence against themselves.”). See Kastigar v. United
States, 406 U.S. 441, 444 (1972) (explaining how the Fifth Amendment right
against self-incrimination “can be asserted in any proceeding . . . .”). See, e.g.,
Dana Milbank, Nobody Sings In This 5th Amendment Stretch, WASH. POST, Mar.
18, 2005, at A12 (noting how former baseball player, when questioned about
steroid use by a House committee, “took the Fifth”); Schmidt, supra note 38, at
A4 (discussing how the witness appearing before a Senate Indian Affairs
Committee hearing “turn[ed] aside all questions by invoking his Fifth
Amendment right against self-incrimination”); NORTH & NOVAK, supra note 38,
at 355 (explaining that during the Iran-Contra hearings, Lt. Col. Oliver North
declined to answer questions based on his Fifth Amendment right against selfincrimination, until he was granted use immunity).

DAVIDSON MACROED.DOC

HARM TO MILITARY PROSECUTIONS

4/18/2006 12:37 PM

291

a congressional hearing, to questions whose answer may tend to
incriminate the witness of state law violations.43
Although some similarities exist, the legal rights of a witness
called to testify before a congressional hearing are significantly
less than those of a defendant in a criminal trial or court-martial. In
a criminal case, it is generally viewed as improper for a prosecutor
to force a witness to invoke the Fifth Amendment right against
self-incrimination in the presence of the jury in order to create an
inference of guilt44 and to comment upon that invocation.45 In
contrast, congressional committees have been known to both force
a public invocation and to criticize the witness after doing so.46
43

United States v. Di Carlo, 102 F. Supp. 597, 606 (N.D. Ohio 1952)
(during a congressional investigation of state crimes).
44
Williams v. Gov’t of the Virgin Islands, 271 F. Supp. 2d 696 (V.I. 2003)
(explaining how a witness asserted her Fifth Amendment right against selfincrimination “no fewer than 70 times” while under examination by prosecutor).
See Prosecutorial Misconduct, 91 GEO. L.J. 556, 565 (2003) (“It is improper for
a prosecutor to call a third-party witness knowing that the witness will invoke
his or her Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, because the
jury might improperly infer guilt from the witness’s silence.”); cf. United States
v. Brown, 12 F.3d 52, 54 (5th Cir. 1994) (prosecution made a conscious effort to
build a case based upon negative inference associated with forced invocation of
spousal privilege before a jury warranted reversal and raised “the spectre of
prosecutorial misconduct . . . .”).
45
United States v. Wharton, 320 F.3d 526, 538 (5th Cir. 2003) (“A
defendant’s Fifth Amendment right to remain silent is well established. A
prosecutor is prohibited from commenting directly or indirectly on a defendant’s
failure to testify or produce evidence.”); United States v. Riley, 47 M.J. 276
(1997) (explaining how an agent’s testimony concerning the accused’s
invocation of his right to remain silent violated the Fifth Amendment and Article
31 of the UCMJ). See United States v. Miller, 48 M.J. 811, 813 (N-M. Ct. Crim.
App. 1998) (“[W]hen an accused is interrogated concerning an offense he is
suspected of committing, his pretrial reliance upon his Article 31 . . . rights may
not be paraded before a court-martial in order that his guilt may be inferred from
his refusal to comment on the charges against him.”) (internal quotation and
citation omitted).
46
See, e.g., Schmidt, supra note 38, at A4 (“[E]ndured blistering attacks
from senator after senator.”); Greg Hitt, Senators Vent Frustration at Silence of
Enron’s Lay, WALL ST. J., Feb. 13, 2002, at A3 (noting how, after invoking his
Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, “Mr. Lay was forced to sit
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Generally, a congressional committee will know in advance if a
witness intends to invoke his privilege against self-incrimination,
but the committee may still subpoena the witness and require him
to formally invoke his Fifth Amendment right against selfincrimination.47
As with certain high-level government officials or leaders of
regulated corporations,48 the stigma associated with a public
invocation of the right against self-incrimination may add
additional practical constraints for an active duty military officer.
Many persons, both within49 and outside50 the military, believe that
through a series of finger-wagging lectures by 20 committee members, many of
them frustrated, many mocking”).
47
Iraola, supra note 13, at 961, 963.
48
Giuffra, supra note 39, at 1 (“If your client is a senior government
official or the head of a heavily regulated corporation, he or she may have little
choice but to answer the committee’s questions. Asserting the Fifth Amendment
may not be a practical alternative.”).
49
During his investigation of the My Lai massacre, Lieutenant General
Peers encountered an Army Major who testified for approximately four hours
and then unexpectedly invoked his right to remain silent. Peers’s reaction is
typical of many career military officers: “This greatly bothered me, as it had
never occurred to me that a Regular Army officer would not testify when called
to do so by a properly appointed investigating officer. It was beyond the realm
of what I considered professional military ethics.” W.R. PEERS, THE MY LAI
INQUIRY 161 (1979).
50
During the Iran-Contra hearings, Senator Warren Rudman was outraged
when Lt. Col. North invoked his Fifth Amendment right while in his Marine
Corps uniform. WARREN B. RUDMAN, COMBAT: TWELVE YEARS IN THE U.S.
SENATE 138 (1996) (“[I]t remained a sorry spectacle to see it invoked by a
uniformed marine officer who was sworn to defend his country and uphold its
laws.”). Robert McFarlane, a retired Marine Lieutenant Colonel and President
Reagan’s National Security Advisor, also found North’s behavior disappointing.
ROBERT MCFARLANE & ZOFIA SMARDZ, SPECIAL TRUST 349 (1994) (“I had
found his behavior disappointing since the scandal had broken—refusing to
testify before the Tower Board or the Senate and House intelligence committees,
citing the Fifth Amendment, and now demanding immunity before agreeing to
appear before the select committees.”). North was also uncomfortable about
invoking his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, and did so after
being persuaded to do so by his attorneys. NORTH & NOVAK, supra note 38, at
355-56. However, at the conclusion of the Iran-Contra prosecutions, McFarlane,
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invoking one’s constitutional rights during an investigation
constitutes behavior inconsistent with that expected of a
professional military officer.
Congressional hearings also differ from criminal trials in that
there are no fixed rules of evidence and Congress may determine
its own procedural rules for such proceedings.51 Accordingly, a
congressional committee or subcommittee need not permit a
witness to cross-examine other witnesses or to call witnesses of his
or her own.52 Indeed, witnesses are not typically afforded these
opportunities.53 Also, a person called before a congressional
investigation or hearing does not enjoy many of the legal
protections of the criminal defendant. Although no published case
has directly addressed the issue, the general consensus is that there
exists no legal right to invoke common law privileges during a
congressional investigation.54 However, committees frequently
who had completely cooperated during the various Iran-Contra investigations,
eventually pled “guilty to four misdemeanor counts of unlawfully withholding
material information from Congress.” MCFARLANE & SMARDZ, supra at 359. In
contrast, North’s convictions for “obstructing Congress, destroying official
documents, and accepting an illegal gratuity,” were set aside on appeal. Id. at
362.
51
SHAMPANSKY, supra note 24, at 29 (“[P]ursuant to art. I, sec. 5, cl. 2 of
the Constitution, each House may determine the rules of its own proceedings.”).
52
Id.
53
Iraola, supra note 13, at 957 (“[W]itnesses appearing before
congressional committees typically are not afforded the opportunity to present
evidence or to cross-examine other witnesses who they believe may have
defamed them.”).
54
Cf. Eastland v. U.S. Servicemen’s Fund, Inc., 421 U.S. 491, 515 (1975)
(Marshall, J., Brennan, J., and Stewart, J., concurring) (explaining how, after
receiving a subpoena, a witness who “refuses to testify or to produce documents
and invokes a pertinent privilege . . . runs the risk that the legislature will cite
him for contempt”). See also SHAMPANSKY, supra note 24, at 29 (“Although
there is no court case directly on point, it appears that congressional committees
are not legally required to allow a witness to decline to testify on the basis of
such a testimonial privilege.”); John P. Reilly, Privilege Claims For The ‘Bliley’
Documents: Mixed Rulings Imperil Basic Principles, 69 DEF. COUNS. J. 50, 53
(Jan. 2002) (“But the limited authorities available demonstrate that Congress
may lawfully disregard common law claims of attorney-client privilege and
compel production of privileged testimony and documents.”). Also, during the
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observe common law privileges as an exercise of discretion.55
Various defenses that may be available in a criminal trial may
not be available to a witness appearing before a congressional
subcommittee. For example, reliance on the advice of counsel,
after a full disclosure of all material facts, serves as a defense to
the mens rea element of a crime.56 This defense has been expressly
recognized by federal,57 military58 and state courts.59 However, it
does not serve as a defense to failing to answer a pertinent question
posed by a congressional committee.60 As early as 1929, in
Iran-Contra hearings, in an exchange with Senator Inouye, Brendan Sullivan,
who represented Oliver North, exclaimed: “I know Congress doesn’t recognize
attorney-client privilege, a husband-and-wife privilege, priest-penitent privilege.
I know those things are all out the window.” NORTH & NOVAK, supra note 38, at
363.
55
SHAMPANSKY, supra note 24, at 30 (“[T]he decision as to whether or not
to allow such a claim of privilege turn[s] on a ‘weighing [of] the legislative need
for disclosure against possible resulting injury.’”) (citation omitted). However,
in at least one instance during a 1986 investigation by the House Committee on
Foreign Affairs, the committee rejected the assertion of the attorney-client
privilege, believing it inapplicable, and cited the witnesses for contempt. Id.
56
United States v. Traitz, 871 F.2d 368, 382 (3rd Cir. 1989).
57
United States v. Poludniak, 657 F.2d 948, 959 (8th Cir. 1981) (advice of
counsel “should be considered in determining whether the defendant’s actions
were willful.”). See United States v. Cheek, 3 F.3d 1057, 1061-62 (7th Cir.
1993) (recognizing the defense, but finding that the evidence did not warrant a
jury instruction).
58
Advice of counsel leads to actions giving rise to obstruction of justice
conviction; overturned on basis of ineffective assistance of counsel. United
States v. Sorbera, 43 M.J. 818 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 1996). See United States v.
Jackson, 30 M.J. 687 (A.C.M.R. 1990) (noting that reliance on the advice of
counsel as a defense results in a waiver of the attorney-client privilege); cf.
United States v. Hicks, 52 M.J. 70, 74 (1999) (Sullivan, J., dissenting) (noting
how attorney who gave bad advice that lead to court-martial charges “most
likely” could have been called as a defense witness on the merits and such
evidence “certainly should have been brought out at the sentencing
hearing . . . .”).
59
See State v. Jacobson, 697 N.W.2d 610, 616 (Minn. 2005); State v. Ross,
659 N.W.2d 122, 130-31 (Wis. Ct. App. 2003); Commonwealth v. Garrity, 682
N.E.2d 937, 941-42 (Mass. App. Ct. 1997).
60
Sinclair v. United States, 279 U.S. 263 (1929), overruled by United
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Sinclair v. United States,61 the Supreme Court held that advice of
counsel serves as no defense to a charge of unlawfully refusing to
answer a pertinent question by a committee of Congress.62 The
Court in Sinclair reasoned that because “[t]he gist of the offense is
the refusal to answer pertinent questions,” and since “[n]o moral
turpitude is involved,” all that need be established is the
“intentional violation” of the law.63 Further, advice of counsel has
been rejected as a defense to failure to respond to a congressional
subpoena.64
Witnesses may only be required to answer questions
“pertinent” to the investigating committee’s authorized area of
inquiry.65 However, because a witness is potentially liable to
criminal prosecution pursuant to 2 U.S.C. § 192, for “refus[ing] to
States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 507 (1995); Licavoli v. United States, 294 F.2d
207 (D.C. Cir. 1961) (“It has been established ever since the Sinclair case that
reliance upon advice of counsel is no defense to a charge of failing to answer a
pertinent question . . . .”). In Gaudin, the Court overruled Sinclair’s holding that
a court, rather than a jury, could determine the “pertinency” of a question posed
by Congress for purposes of 2 U.S.C. § 192, “making it criminal contempt of
Congress to refuse to answer a ‘question pertinent to [a] question under
[congressional] inquiry.” 515 U.S. at 519. In Gaudin, the Court held that the
“materiality” of an allegedly false statement was to be decided by a jury, rather
than by a judge. Id. at 506.
61
279 U.S. 263 (1929).
62
Id. at 299. The Court also held that a mistake of law failed to serve as a
defense. Id.
63
Id. Sinclair had been convicted of violating 2 U.S.C. § 192, which made
it a misdemeanor offense for any “person who having been summoned as a
witness by the authority of either House of Congress, to give testimony or to
produce papers upon any matter under inquiry before either House, or any
committee of either House of Congress, willfully makes default, or who, having
appeared, refuses to answer any question pertinent to the question under
inquiry . . . .” Id. at 284 (quoting 2 U.S.C. §192).
64
Dennis v. United States, 171 F.2d 986, 991 (D.C. Cir. 1948) (“[H]is
failure to respond to the subpoena was the result of his own legal opinion based
upon consultation with his unnamed counsel is no defense.”).
65
Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 206 (1957) (“No witness can be
compelled to make disclosures on matters outside that area. This is a
jurisdictional concept of pertinency drawn from the nature of a congressional
committee’s source of authority.”).
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answer any question pertinent to the question under inquiry,” such
witness must be placed on fair notice as to the parameters of the
authorized area of inquiry.66 The adequacy of that notice is
measured by the same “degree of explicitness and certitude that the
Due Process requires in the expression of any element of a
criminal offense.”67
For purposes of a congressional investigation, notice to the
witness may be found in the “authorizing resolution, the remarks
of the chairman or members of the committee, or even the nature
of the proceedings themselves . . . .”68 When the subject matter of
the investigation has not been “made to appear with undisputable
clarity,” a witness may object to the pertinency of a question and
require that the committee “state for the record the subject under
inquiry at that time and the manner in which the propounded
questions are pertinent thereto.”69 Further, the witness may seek
the “connective reasoning” between the question and the subject
matter of the investigation.70
II. DISCLOSURE OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE JENCKS ACT AND BRADY
V. MARYLAND
The applicability of the Jencks Act, and to a lesser extent,
Brady v. Maryland and its progeny, to the military justice system
was a significant issue during the courts-martial conducted in the
wake of the My Lai massacre. Indeed, in the court-martial of Staff
66

Watkins, 354 U.S. at 208-09 (explaining that a witness is “entitled to
have knowledge of the subject to which the interrogation is deemed pertinent.”).
Before a witness may be convicted for failing to answer a pertinent question, the
witness’s “awareness of the pertinency of the information” must be
contemporaneous with the witness’s refusal to answer the question. Id. at 217
(Frankfurter, J., concurring). In a prosecution for violating 2 U.S.C. § 192,
“[p]ertinency is an element of the offense,” which must be established by the
United States. United States v. Di Carlo, 102 F. Supp. 597, 601 (N.D. Ohio
1952).
67
Watkins, 354 U.S. at 209.
68
Id.
69
Id. at 214-15.
70
Id. at 215.
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Sergeant David Mitchell, the military judge’s interpretation of the
government’s Jencks Act obligations, with regard to evidence in
the possession of a congressional subcommittee, proved fatal to the
prosecution.71
Generally, the Jencks Act requires the United States to produce
to the defense any statement in its possession of a witness who has
testified for the prosecution in a criminal case. The government’s
disclosure obligation is triggered only after a witness has
testified,72 and the defense has moved for production of that
witness’s prior statements.73 The Jencks Act requires that the
sought-after statements relate “to the subject matter as to which the
witness has testified.”74 The government’s failure to satisfy its
Jencks Act obligations may result in a court striking the testimony
of a witness or declaring a mistrial.75 The requirements of the
Jencks Act are contained in Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
26.276 and, for the military, in Rule for Courts-Martial (R.C.M.)
914.77
Another disclosure requirement, the Brady obligation, is
mandated by case law. In Brady v. Maryland,78 the Supreme Court
required the government to disclose specifically requested
71

See discussion infra Part II.B.
18 U.S.C. § 3500(a) (explaining that the government’s disclosure
obligation is not triggered “until said witness has testified on direct examination
in the trial of the case”).
73
18 U.S.C. § 3500(b).
74
Id.
75
18 U.S.C. § 3500(d).
76
2A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE:
CRIMINAL § 436 (3d. ed. 2000).
77
See United States v. Moravec, No. NMCM 200000202, 2002 WL
31656114, at *4 n.6 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App., Nov. 20, 2002) (“R.C.M. 914, the
military equivalent of the Jencks Act.”); United States v. Cook, No. ACM33615,
2001 WL 85804, at *6 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App., Jan. 29, 2001) (R.C.M. 914 “is
based upon the Jencks Act.”). The Rules for Courts-Martial “govern the
procedures and punishments in all courts-martial and, whenever expressly
provided, preliminary, supplementary, and appellate procedures and activities.”
MCM, supra note 41, R.C.M. 101(a).
78
373 U.S. 83 (1963).
72
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exculpatory evidence that is material either to the defendant’s guilt
or punishment.79 The failure to make such a disclosure “violates
due process . . . irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the
prosecution.”80 In United States v. Agurs,81 the Court held that this
disclosure duty existed even when no specific request had been
made for such evidence.82 Further, in United States v. Bagley,83 the
Court extended the disclosure obligation to include not only
exculpatory evidence, but also impeachment evidence.84
Significantly, the Court has also imposed an obligation on “the
individual prosecutor . . . to learn of any favorable evidence known
to the others acting on the government’s behalf in the case . . . .”85
A. My Lai Massacre Courts-Martial
On March 16, 1968, Task Force Barker, a battalion-sized unit
from the 11th Infantry Brigade, Americal Division, conducted a
search and destroy mission in the vicinity of Son My village,
Republic of South Vietnam, which the Americans believed was
occupied by the Viet Cong.86 Charlie Company87 of that Task
Force assaulted My Lai, a hamlet of the village, eventually killing
between 175-200 Vietnamese civilians, consisting “almost
exclusively of old men, women and children.”88 The killings
79

Id. at 87.
Id.
81
427 U.S. 97 (1976).
82
Id. at 107.
83
473 U.S. 667 (1985).
84
Id. at 676 (“Impeachment evidence . . . as well as exculpatory evidence,
falls within the Brady rule.”). See also Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 433
(1995) (“[T]he Court disavowed any difference between exculpatory and
impeachment evidence for Brady purposes . . . .”).
85
Kyles, 514 U.S. at 437.
86
GUENTER LEWY, AMERICA IN VIETNAM 325 (1978).
87
Charlie Company, also known as C Company, was a unit consisting of
approximately 180 men. MICHAEL R. BELKNAP, THE VIETNAM WAR ON TRIAL:
THE MY LAI MASSACRE AND THE COURT-MARTIAL OF LIEUTENANT CALLEY 41
(2002).
88
LEWY, supra note 86, at 326. Task Force Barker was responsible for the
80
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occurred despite the absence of the anticipated Viet Cong unit.89
Charlie Company “received no hostile fire from the village.”90
The massacre only came to light after a Vietnam veteran,
Ronald Ridenhour, wrote various military and civilian officials on
March 29, 1969, about reports of misconduct he had received
concerning My Lai.91 The Ridenhour letter caused the Army Chief
of Staff, General William Westmoreland, to direct an Army
Inspector General (IG) investigation of the incident.92 After the IG
established that criminal misconduct had occurred, General
Westmoreland transferred the investigation to the Army’s Criminal
Investigation Division (CID), whose additional investigative
efforts ultimately lead to charges being brought against a number
of soldiers,93 including one of Charlie Company’s platoon leaders,
Lieutenant William Calley.94
While the CID investigation was proceeding, General
Westmoreland remained concerned about the possibility of a
cover-up and the public perception that the Army was not
diligently investigating the massacre.95 Despite some initial
deaths of approximately 400 Vietnamese. Id.
89
Id. (“[N]o enemy forces were encountered.”).
90
United States v. Calley, 48 C.M.R. 19, 23 (C.M.A. 1973).
91
LEWY, supra note 86, at 326. See also PEERS, supra note 49, at 7 (“His
letter proved to be the key to uncovering the tragedy, and had he not sent it, it is
conceivable that the My Lai incident would have remained hidden to this day.”).
92
PEERS, supra note 49, at 8. Upon receiving the letter, General
Westmoreland directed that immediate inquiries be made in Vietnam and when
initial reports suggested “something untoward might have happened,” directed
an IG investigation. WILLIAM C. WESTMORELAND, A SOLDIER REPORTS 375
(1976). Although Westmoreland was Army Chief of Staff at the time Ridenhour
reported the incident, the General had been the senior Army commander in
Vietnam when the massacre actually occurred. PEERS, supra note 49, at 241.
93
Ultimately the CID investigation caused the Army to charge four officers
and nine soldiers, of which two officers and three soldiers were eventually
brought to trial. WESTMORELAND, supra note 92, at 375.
94
PEERS, supra note 49, at 8, 18 (“[T]he charges against Lieutenant Calley
grew out of an investigation by the Criminal Investigation Division”).
95
Id. at 8-9. See WESTMORELAND, supra note 92, at 375 (“. . . possibility
that officers of the 11th Brigade and the Americal Division had either covered up
the incident or failed to make a comprehensive investigation.”).
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resistance from members of the Nixon administration,96
Westmoreland and Army Secretary Stanley Resor elected to
proceed with an additional formal investigation to be lead by
Lieutenant General William R. Peers.97 Ultimately this
investigative effort became known as the Peers Commission. The
Peers Commission produced a detailed report on the massacre that
consisted of “some 20,000 pages of testimony from almost 400
witnesses, and, in addition, contained 240 photographs, 119 Army
directives and over 100 miscellaneous documents.”98 Even the
congressional subcommittee conducting a parallel investigation
ultimately acknowledged that the report was “very thorough.”99
Clearly the Army was capable of investigating the incident.
In addition to the Army’s investigation, Congress elected to
launch its own investigation. Although several House and Senate
committees sought to conduct the investigation, the task eventually
fell to the House Armed Services Committee.100 On November 26,
1969, the same day that the Army announced the creation of the
Peers Commission, Congressman L. Mendel Rivers, Chairman of
the House Armed Services Committee initiated its investigation.101
Within a matter of weeks, the Committee received testimony from
96

WESTMORELAND, supra note 92, at 375 (“When I learned that some
members of President Nixon’s administration wanted to whitewash any possible
negligence within the chain of command, I threatened through a White House
official to exercise my prerogative as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to go
personally to the President and object.”); PEERS, supra note 49, at 3 n.1
(Westmoreland “encountered considerable resistance from within the
Department of Defense, which he strongly suspected had originated in the White
House.”).
97
WESTMORELAND, supra note 92, at 375-76.
98
Calley v. Callaway, 519 F.2d 184, 221 (5th Cir. 1975).
99
Id.
100
PEERS, supra note 49, at 19. See also MICHAEL R. BELKNAP, THE
VIETNAM WAR ON TRIAL: THE MAI LAI MASSACRE AND THE COURT-MARTIAL
OF LIEUTENANT CALLEY 137 (2002) (“[S]everal Senate and House committees
vied for the right to investigate the My Lai incident.”).
101
BELKNAP, supra note 100, at 137. Representative Rivers had also
received a letter from Ridenhour. United States v. Calley, 46 C.M.R. 1131, 1184
(A.C.M.R. 1973), aff’d 48 C.M.R. 19 (C.M.A. 1973).
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several individuals in executive session, including Peers who
appeared before it to give a background briefing and who also
requested that no witnesses be called to testify by that body before
the Peers Commission had questioned them.102 Also called to
testify by the Committee was Captain Ernest Medina, the Charlie
Company commander during the assault on My Lai.103
Subsequently, on December 19, 1969 a subcommittee under
the leadership of Representative F. Edward Hebert was formed to
investigate My Lai, which initially limited itself to staff interviews
of witnesses until it began formal hearings six months later.104
Almost immediately after being created, however, the
Congressional subcommittee sent requests to the Army to arrange
for the testimony of witnesses, many of whom had not yet been
questioned by Peers.105 Some of the witnesses Hebert’s
subcommittee sought to question were either material witnesses or
were pending charges.106
Army Secretary Resor offered to provide the subcommittee
with transcripts of testimony taken by the Army and requested that
the subcommittee delay its questioning so as not to interfere with
the Army’s courts-martial and prejudice the rights of the military
defendants.107 In letters to Hebert in December, January and April,
Secretary Resor opined “that discharge of our responsibility to
execute the laws will be imperiled by such actions as your
subcommittee now contemplates.”108 Hebert refused to desist and
his subcommittee issued subpoenas compelling testimony,
eventually interviewing more than 150 witnesses.109 Included
among those questioned were Captain Medina, Charlie Company
commander; Medina’s brigade commander, Colonel Oran K.
102

PEERS, supra note 49, at 20. See also BELKNAP, supra note 100, at 137-

103

BELKNAP, supra note 100, at 137.
PEERS, supra note 49, at 22.
BELKNAP, supra note 100, at 139.
Id.
Id.
Id. (internal quotation omitted).
Id.

38.
104
105
106
107
108
109
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Henderson; and Major General Samuel W. Koster, the Americal
Division commander.110 Later, both Medina and Henderson were
tried, but acquitted, at their courts-martial.111
At the conclusion of the hearings, Secretary Resor requested
that witness’ transcripts be turned over to the Army, but Hebert
refused, citing assurances the subcommittee made to the witnesses
that “their testimony would not be disclosed voluntarily to anyone
outside the subcommittee.”112 Such assurances had been made in
order to obtain “frank and complete statements from the
witnesses . . . .”113 When the military courts issued subpoenas for
the transcripts for use at trial, Hebert again refused, positing that
the transcripts would not be released until all courts-martial that
might arise from the My Lai massacre were complete.114
The motivation behind Hebert’s refusal to release the
transcripts has been the subject of dispute. One author opined that
“Hebert’s subcommittee seemed more interested in discrediting
those who had exposed the war crimes committed at My Lai than
in ensuring that those responsible for them were punished.”115 The
subcommittee “badgered” and “grilled” Ronald Haeberle, a former
combat photographer, about his failure to report the massacre and
his use of photographs from a personal camera.116 When Warrant
Officer Hugh Thompson testified, Hebert “interrogated him
mercilessly about whether he had ordered his crew to shoot at
other American soldiers” and about the citations for medals that
Thompson and his crew had received for rescuing Vietnamese
civilians from the massacre.117 General Peers characterized the
110

Id. at 140.
PEERS, supra note 49, at photo insert.
112
BELKNAP, supra note 100, at 142.
113
Id. (internal quotation omitted).
114
Id. (Hebert “treated the transcripts as classified documents and refused
to allow their release ‘until final disposition has been made of all criminal cases
now pending which may arise from the My Lai affair.’”).
115
Id. at 140. The Nixon Administration viewed Hebert as an ally in their
effort to discredit Ridenhour. Id. at 137.
116
Id. at 140-41.
117
Id. at 141. A helicopter pilot, Thompson evacuated approximately a
111
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questioning of Thompson as “more of an inquisition than an
investigation.”118 Additionally, Peers reported that at the initial
stages of the congressional investigation, Chairman Rivers
confidently told him: “You know our boys would never do
anything like that.”119
In contrast, Hebert interrupted the questioning of Medina when
another subcommittee member, Congressman Stratton, forcefully
pressed the former Charlie Company commander about the
instructions he had given to his soldiers.120 When General Koster’s
attorney objected to Stratton’s “rigorous” questioning of the former
Americal Division commander, Hebert admonished Stratton “to
ask him affirmative questions, without an effort to impeach his
testimony.”121 Additionally, both Rivers and Hebert publicly
criticized the Army for pursuing courts-martial against those
soldiers involved in the massacre.122
Regardless of the motivation underlying the subcommittee’s
position, Hebert’s refusal to release the transcripts affected at least
three courts-martial, and in the court-martial of Staff Sergeant
David Mitchell, the refusal proved fatal for the prosecution.
Mitchell had been a squad leader in Calley’s first platoon during
the My Lai incident.123 On October 6, 1970, the court-martial of
Sergeant Mitchell began. Shortly thereafter, the military judge
ruled in favor of the defense to suppress testimony based on a
violation of the Jencks Act.124 The military judge determined that
because of the Hebert subcommittee’s refusal to release testimony
transcripts, no one who testified before that subcommittee would

dozen civilians from My Lai to safety while the massacre was ongoing. PEERS,
supra note 49, at 71.
118
PEERS, supra note 49, at 242.
119
Id. at 21.
120
BELKNAP, supra note 100, at 140.
121
Id. (internal quotation omitted).
122
Id. at 141-42.
123
United States v. Calley, 46 C.M.R. 1131, 1147 n.14 (A.C.M.R. 1973),
aff’d, 48 C.M.R. 19 (C.M.A. 1973).
124
BELKNAP, supra note 100, at 224.
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be permitted to testify at Mitchell’s court-martial.125 With his case
now severely hamstrung, the military trial counsel (prosecutor)
could call only three of the numerous witnesses that he originally
contemplated.126 In contrast, Mitchell’s lawyer put on a robust
defense, calling over twenty witnesses including the accused.127
Not surprisingly, the military panel returned a verdict of not
guilty.128
The second court-martial impacted by Hebert’s refusal to
release transcripts was that of Sergeant Charles Hutto, which began
in January 1971. Hutto had been a machine gunner in Charlie
Company’s second platoon.129 Unlike the military judge in
Mitchell’s court-martial, however, the court denied the defense’s
Jencks Act motion.130 The defense presented a superior orders
defense, buttressed by the testimony of a clinical psychologist who
testified that Hutto “lacked the capacity to make a judgment
concerning whether [a directive to kill all the people] was legal or
illegal.”131 Even without a Jencks Act problem, the Army was
unable to obtain a conviction. After deliberating less than two
hours, the military jury acquitted Hutto.132
The third, and best known, court-martial affected by the Hebert
refusal was that of Lieutenant William Calley. On the day of the
May Lai massacre, Calley commanded Charlie Company’s first
platoon. After an extensive trial, Calley was “convicted of the
premeditated murder of 22 infants, children, women, and old men,
and of assault with intent to commit murder a child of about 2
years of age.”133 On appeal to the Army Court of Military Review,
Calley challenged his convictions, in part, based on an alleged

125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133

Id.
Id.
Id. at 224-25.
Id. at 225.
Id. at 65.
BELKNAP, supra note 100, at 225.
Id.
Id. at 226.
United States v. Calley, 48 C.M.R. 19, 21 (C.M.A. 1973).
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violation of the Jencks Act and Brady disclosure obligations.134
The day after the subcommittee had published its report, and
four months prior to the beginning of the Calley court-martial on
the merits, the defense filed a motion seeking “production of ‘[a]ll
witness testimony and documentary evidence in the custody of the
House of Representatives . . . .’”135 In response to a letter from the
trial counsel, Representative Hebert refused to produce testimony
and other evidence, positing that because Congress was a separate
branch of Government, the subcommittee documents were neither
subject to Brady nor to the Jencks Act.136 The military judge
denied the defense motion for discovery, finding that all witness
testimony and statements within the Army’s possession had been
furnished to the defense and that the Government offered to pay
for travel expenses associated with witness interviews.137 Without
reaching the issue of Jencks Act applicability to Congress, the
military judge issued a “precatory order” that sought all “evidence
given to the investigating committee by named prosecution
witnesses.”138 Two months later, the military judge reissued its
order to the newly convened Congress with a subpoena, but the
material was never released.139 Eventually, of the sixteen witnesses
134

United States v. Calley, 46 C.M.R. 131, 1138, 1184-95 n.14 (A.C.M.R.
1973), aff’d, 48 C.M.R. 19, 22 (C.M.A. 1973). The A.C.M.R. is the Army’s
intermediate level appellate authority, followed by the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Armed Forces (formerly the U.S. Court of Military Appeals). MCM, supra
note 41, R.C.M. 1203-1204. The Supreme Court serves as the final appellate
court. Id. R.C.M. 1205.
135
Calley, 46 C.M.R. at 1186.
136
Id. Hebert did provide a witness list of those who had testified. Id.
Shortly thereafter, the defense expanded its request for production for “all that
Congress possessed relative to My Lai,” citing not only Brady and the Jencks
Act, but also the Constitution, the Uniform Code of Military Justice and the
inherent power of the court. Id.
137
Id. at 1186-87.
138
Id. at 1187. “As directed to the House the order was necessarily
precatory; for Judge Kennedy cited therein his recognition of the Constitutional
provision that a House may except from publication such part of the journal of
its proceedings as in its judgment requires secrecy . . . .” Id.
139
Id.
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who were called to testify at the Calley court-martial, eleven had
been called by the trial counsel (prosecutor) and also testified in
executive session before the Hebert subcommittee.140
Addressing the alleged violation of the Jencks Act, in what the
court characterized as a case of first impression,141 the Army Court
of Military Review (ACMR) determined that the Act did “not
pertain to statements given to the Congress.”142 The court
interpreted the term “United States” in the Jencks Act to refer to
the sovereign as prosecutor acting through the executive branch.143
In further support of its conclusion that the term “United States”
referred only to the executive branch, the court noted that the
enforcement mechanism of a defendant’s right to inspect was
through a court order, but a court had no authority to order the
House to release its records.144
Finally, the court was concerned that inclusion of the
legislative branch within the scope of the Jencks Act would violate
the separation of powers doctrine.145 Here the court reasoned that:
[I]f a committee called all the witnesses before the
prosecution commenced criminal litigation, if the
committee declined to release the testimony it heard, and if
the Jencks Act is held to apply, the effect would be to
preclude the prosecution’s proving its case. This would be
an inroad of constitutional dimensions upon the executive
140

United States v. Calley, 46 C.M.R. 131, 1138, 1185 (A.C.M.R. 1973),
aff’d, 48 C.M.R. 19, 22 (C.M.A. 1973).
141
Id. at 1191.
142
Id. at 1192.
143
Id.
144
Id. at 1192-93. Since at least 1951, military courts have possessed the
authority to compel the attendance of civilian witnesses at a court-martial
through issuance of a warrant of attachment. United States v. Hinton, 21 M.J.
267, 270 (C.M.A. 1986). Failure to appear before a court-martial is a federal
offense. Id. at 269 (citing 10 U.S.C. § 847). However, these procedures do not
apply when a witness cannot be compelled to appear. Id. at 271 n.8. The
enforceability of a subpoena duces tecum “is in virtually every respect identical
to a request for production of a witness.” United States v. Rodriguez, 57 M.J.
765, 770 (N-M.Ct. Crim. App. 2002), aff’d, 60 M.J. 239 (2004).
145
Calley, 46 C.M.R. at 1193-94.
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and judicial functions.146
As a precautionary measure, the court also concluded that if the
Jencks Act did apply, that any error by the trial court in failing to
enforce it was harmless.147
Since Calley was unsuccessful in exploiting the Jencks Act as
grounds for appeal within the military system,148 Calley sought
habeas corpus relief in federal district court.149 In Calley v.
Callaway,150 the district court found Calley’s convictions
“constitutionally invalid,” and ordered his release from military
custody.151 As part of its analysis, the court disagreed with the
decision of the ACMR that the Jencks Act did not apply to
testimony given before a Congressional subcommittee and posited
that the testimony of those witnesses who testified before Hebert’s
subcommittee and at Calley’s court-martial should have been
stricken.152 Further, the court reasoned that even if the Jencks Act
was inapplicable, “there nevertheless was a clear violation of
[Calley’s] constitutional right to confrontation and compulsory
process resulting from the refusal of the Congress to honor the
subpoenas issued by the military judge.”153
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
146

Id. at 1194.
Id. at 1195.
148
The U.S Court of Military Appeals did not address the alleged Jencks
Act violation. See United States v. Calley, 48 C.M.R. 19 (C.M.A. 1973).
Calley’s attorneys filed “a massive 422-page petition for review, raising thirty
issues,” but the court elected to hear only three. BELKNAP, supra note 100, at
240.
149
By the time of the habeas corpus petition, Calley was on parole. Calley
v. Callaway, 519 F.2d 184, 191 n.5 (5th Cir. 1975). The military panel (jury)
sentenced Calley to life, which was reduced to twenty years by the convening
authority, and further reduced to ten years by the Secretary of the Army and then
released on parole. Id. at 190, 91 n.5.
150
382 F. Supp. 650 (M.D. Ga. 1974).
151
Id. at 712-13.
152
Id. at 700-01. The court also found that Calley was denied his
constitutional rights because of the massive pretrial publicity and because the
military charges were improper. Id. at 650.
153
Id. at 701.
147
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Circuit reversed.154 Addressing the subcommittee’s refusal to
release witness testimony, the court concluded “that there was no
denial of due process in the failure to supply the prior testimony,
and even if a Jencks Act violation occurred, it does not rise to a
level warranting habeas corpus relief.”155 The court noted the
Army’s liberal discovery procedures, that the defense had been
provided with testimony and statements gathered during several
investigations, had been granted access to the entire Peers report,
and that the defense had been permitted to conduct an independent
investigation at government expense.156 The court pointed out that
“[t]he discovery by the defense was so extensive that, of the 13
witnesses appearing before both the Hebert Subcommittee and the
court-martial, the defense already possessed at least two prior
statements, and often more, from all 13 witnesses save one, for
whom they possessed one prior statement.”157 Given these
circumstances, the court concluded that it was “impossible” to find
a due process violation.158 The court easily turned aside the
argument that the failure to produce testimony from the Hebert
hearings violated Brady, finding that the defense had failed to
establish materiality.159
B. Current State of Military Law
Calley was the last case in which the applicability of the Jencks
Act to the military was addressed in the context of a congressional
investigation or hearing. Since Calley, however, military
jurisprudence has developed sufficiently to resolve future issues of
applicability should the issue arise again in the future.
The military justice system employs a liberal system of
discovery and disclosure, which is “designed to be broader than in
civilian life [and] provide the accused, at a minimum, with the
154
155
156
157
158
159

Calley, 519 F.2d at 184.
Id. at 220.
Id. at 220-21.
Id. at 221.
Id.
Id. at 222.
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disclosure and discovery rights available in federal civilian
proceedings.”160 Article 46 of the Uniform Code of Military
Justice, for example, mandates equal access to evidence for both
the prosecution and defense.161 Additionally, the courts have held
that the Jencks Act applies to the military justice system.162
Critical to any analysis of the Government’s obligation to
produce testimony or other witness statements in the possession of
Congress, is the limitation of 18 U.S.C.A § 3500(b), and
implementing R.C.M. 914(a)(1), that the statement be “in the
possession of the United States.”163 Since its earlier decision in
Calley, the ACMR has reaffirmed its position that statements in the
possession of the United States for Jencks Act purposes are limited
to statements in the possession of prosecutors and those persons
acting in an official investigatory capacity.164

160

United States v. Williams, 50 M.J. 436, 440 (1999). See also United
States v. Santos, 59 M.J. 317, 321 (2004) (“The military justice system provides
for broader discovery than required by practice in federal civilian criminal
trials.”). For an overview of the modern day military justice system, see
generally MICHAEL J. DAVIDSON, A GUIDE TO MILITARY CRIMINAL LAW
(1999).
161
Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 846, Art. 46 (2002).
Article 46, and its implementing RCM 701, afford broader discovery rights
“than that required by the Constitution under Brady v. Maryland . . . or
otherwise available to federal defendants in civilian trials under Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure 12 and 16.” United States v. Shelton, 59 M.J. 727, 734
(Army Ct. Crim. App. 2004).
162
United States v. Marsh, 21 M.J. 445, 451 (C.M.A. 1986) (“It is now
well-established that the Jencks Act applies to trials by court-martial.”); United
States v. Gomez, 15 M.J. 954, 962 (A.C.M.R. 1983) (“The Jencks Act applies in
the military . . . .”). See United States v. Longstreath, 42 M.J. 806, 818 (N-M.Ct.
Crim. App. 1995) (discussing the Government’s obligations under R.C.M.
701(a)(2) and the Jencks Act).
163
18 U.S.C.A. § 3500(b) (West 2000 & Supp. 2004); MCM, supra note
41, R.C.M. 914(a)(1).
164
United States v. Ali, 12 M.J. 1018, 1019-20 (A.C.M.R. 1982)
(concluding that a company commander has investigative duties and thus the
Jencks Act may apply to a statement in his possession). See also United States v.
Gomez, 15 M.J. 954, 964 (A.C.M.R. 1983) (applies only to statements in the
possession of those persons “engaged in the prosecutorial function.”).
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The ACMR’s position is consistent with applicable federal165
and state166 case law, including at least one Watergate-era case that
interpreted the Act in the context of testimony rendered before a
Congressional subcommittee. In United States v. Ehrlichman,167 G.
Gordon Liddy moved to strike the testimony of E. Howard Hunt, a
prosecution witness who had also testified in executive session
before the Subcommittee on Intelligence of the House Armed
Services Committee. Liddy’s motion was based in part on the
Jencks Act because Hunt’s congressional testimony had not been
produced to the defense.168 The congressional subcommittee
declined to produce the testimony in response to two separate
subpoenas that Liddy caused to be issued.169
The court denied the motion to strike, holding that the Jencks
Act was not applicable to the congressional testimony.170 The court
posited: “there is no indication that Congress intended it to
encompass its own legislative proceedings held in executive
session, and its previous and continued resistance to subpoenas
duces tecum argues strongly to the contrary.”171 On appeal, the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
avoided the issue of Jencks Act applicability and simply found that
Liddy suffered no prejudice by the subcommittee’s failure to
produce witness transcripts.172
Similarly, Brady obligations apply to the military justice
system, as codified in the Manual for Court-Martial (RCM 701).173
In pertinent part, RCM 701 requires “[t]he trial counsel [to]
165

United States v. Trevino, 556 F.2d 1265, 1271 (5th Cir. 1977) (“the
prosecutorial division of the government”; “in the hands of the federal
prosecutor”).
166
See, e.g. Robinson v. State, 730 A.2d 181, 186 (Md. 1999) (Maryland,
which follows the Jencks Act, defines statements in its possession to those held
by “the prosecution or the prosecutorial arm of the government . . . .”).
167
389 F. Supp. 95 (D.D.C. 1974).
168
Id. at 96.
169
Id.
170
Id. at 97.
171
Id.
172
United States v. Liddy, 542 F.2d 76, 83 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
173
United States v. Williams, 50 M.J. 436, 440 (1999).
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disclose to the defense . . . evidence known to the trial counsel
which reasonably tends to: (A) Negate the guilt of the accused of
an offense charged; (B) Reduce the degree of guilt of the accused
of an offense charged; or (C) Reduce the punishment.”174
With respect to any future dispute involving testimony or other
information in Congress’s control, assuming that the sought after
testimony were deemed material, the few military courts to have
addressed this issue appear to follow a line of analysis similar to
that found with the Jencks Act.175
In United States v. Williams, the military court reasoned that a
threshold question as to the government’s obligation to produce
discoverable information for purposes of R.C.M. 701 and Brady
“is whether the information at issue was located within the
parameters of the files that the prosecution must review for
exculpatory material.”176 Generally, the prosecution must conduct
a due diligence search of its own files, files of other participating
law enforcement authorities, investigative files of related cases
“maintained by an entity ‘closely aligned with the’ prosecution,”
and certain other files if “designated in a defense discovery
request, that involved a specified type of information within a
specified entity.”177 “To the extent that relevant files are known to
be under the control of another governmental entity [e.g.
Congress], the prosecution must make that fact known to the
defense and engage in ‘good faith efforts’ to obtain the
material.”178 In short, congressional testimony should not be
deemed to be in the possession of the government for Brady
purposes and the government’s obligation is limited to making a
good faith effort to obtain it.
This was the position taken by the District Court of the District
of Columbia in the case of United States v. Ehrlichman.179 In that
174

MCM, supra note 41, R.C.M. 701(a)(6).
United States v. Williams, 50 M.J. 436 (1999). See United States v.
Tillmon, 1999 WL 1005923, at *3 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. Oct. 19, 1999).
176
Williams, 50 M.J. at 440.
177
Id. at 441.
178
Id.
179
389 F. Supp. 95, 95 (D.D.C. 1974).
175
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case the court held that Brady did not apply: “The subpoenaed
testimony is not in the possession of the Government within the
meaning of that decision, since the Subcommittee is neither an
investigative nor a prosecutorial arm of the Executive Branch nor
an agency of the Government in any way involved in the offense or
related transaction.”180

III. ANALYSIS OF CONGRESS’S AUTHORITY TO GRANT IMMUNITY
AND THE EFFECT OF SUCH A GRANT ON FUTURE OR PARALLEL
CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS
A congressional grant of immunity poses a significant threat to
the government’s ability to obtain a conviction against an
immunized witness who testifies before a congressional hearing.
This is particularly so if the hearing is well publicized, because of
the enormous burden placed on prosecutors to establish that they
did not benefit from immunized testimony. Indeed, two of the
principle defendants in the Iran Contra scandal prosecutions were
able to obtain reversals of their convictions because the
prosecution was unable to satisfy this standard. Accordingly, this
article reviews Congress’s immunity power and the impact grants
of immunity can have on the criminal justice system.
A. Overview of Congress’s Authority to Grant Immunity
If two-thirds of its members agree, a congressional committee
may grant “use” immunity to a witness.181 However, 18 U.S.C. §
180

Id. at 97. On appeal, the court declined to address the applicability of
Brady to the Congressional testimony; instead, finding that the failure to
produce the transcripts was “harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” United
States v. Liddy, 542 F.2d 76, 83 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
181
18 U.S.C. § 6005(b)(2). See also Giuffra, supra note 39, at *4; cf.
Senators Join Coverup, WALL ST. J., June 7, 1996, at A12 (“A two-thirds vote
of the Whitewater Committee is needed to grant use immunity . . . .”).
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6005 requires that the Attorney General be given notice of the
immunity at least ten days before a court order is sought and that
the district court issuing the order to testify wait an additional
twenty days from the date of request for an order before issuing
it.182 The notice period was intended to give the Department of
Justice (DOJ) an opportunity to (1) convince the investigating
congressional committee not to grant immunity if DOJ objected to
immunity, and (2) insulate DOJ’s evidence from any adverse
affects of an immunity grant.183 Significantly, however, Congress
is not bound by DOJ objections to grants of immunity.184
Once the (sub)committee chairperson communicates the
court’s order to testify to the witness, that person may no longer
invoke his or her Fifth Amendment right against selfincrimination.185 However, “no testimony or other information
compelled under the order, or any information directly or indirectly
derived from such testimony or other information may be used
Additionally, the House or Senate may approve a grant of immunity by a
majority vote. 18 U.S.C. § 6005(b)(1). Use immunity differs significantly from
transactional immunity. See infra note 187.
182
18 U.S.C. § 6005(b)(3), (c). The Department of Justice may waive the
10-day notice requirement. In the Matter of the Application of the U.S. Senate
Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations, 655 F.2d 1232, 1236 (D.C. Cir. 1981)
(The requirement was “plainly intended to benefit solely the Department of
Justice.”).
183
Matter of the Application, 655 F.2d at 1236. See also Application of
U.S. Senate Select Comm. on Presidential Campaign Activities, 361 F. Supp.
1270, 1277 (D.D.C. 1973).
184
Application of the U.S. Senate Select Comm., 361 F. Supp. at 1276. See
Jill Abramson, Huang Offers To Testify Before Senate If Granted Immunity On
Fund Charges, WALL ST. J., July 9, 1997, at A3 (asserting that “the Senate isn’t
bound by the Justice Department’s recommendations on immunity . . . .”).
185
18 U.S.C. § 6002. Even though the district court will have already
issued its order to testify, the order is not effective until the witness has
indicated a refusal to testify and the order is communicated to the witness by the
investigating Congressional committee. Matter of Application, 655 F.2d at 1237
& n.21. See NORTH & NOVAK, supra note 38, at 356 (“To put [use immunity]
into effect, I had to begin by publicly and formally claiming my constitutional
protections against self-incrimination. Senator Inouye, chairman of the Senate
select committee, then spelled out the terms . . . .”).
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against the witness in any criminal case, except a prosecution for
perjury, giving a false statement, or otherwise failing to comply
with the order.”186 This type of immunity is commonly referred to
as “testimonial” or “use” immunity.187
Reviewing the federal immunity statutes, 18 U.S.C. §§ 60016005, the Supreme Court in Kastigar v. United States,188 held that
the use immunity granted by the statute was “coextensive with the
scope of the privilege against self-incrimination”189 and prohibited
“the prosecutorial authorities from using the compelled testimony
in any respect . . . .”190 Further, the Court “impose[d] on the
prosecution the affirmative duty to prove that the evidence it
proposes to use is derived from a legitimate source wholly
independent of the compelled testimony.”191 The interpretation of
Kastigar’s requirements by the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia proved an insurmountable burden for the
government in the prosecutions following the Iran-Contra scandal.

186

18 U.S.C. § 6002. For purposes of this statute, “‘other information’
includes any book, paper, document, record, recording, or other material.” 18
U.S.C. § 6001(2).
187
Ronald F. Wright, Congressional Use of Immunity Grants After IranContra, 80 MINN. L. REV. 407, 415 (1995) (Use immunity “promises only that
the government will not use the compelled testimony directly as evidence, and
will not use it indirectly as an investigative lead to obtain evidence for a criminal
case.”). See also Matter of the Application, 655 F.2d at 1234 n.7 (“Rather than
barring a subsequent related prosecution [use immunity] acts only to suppress, in
any such prosecution, the witness’s testimony and evidence derived directly or
indirectly from that testimony.”). In contrast, transactional immunity “precludes
prosecution for any transaction or affair about which a witness testifies.” Id.
Accord MCM, supra note 41, R.C.M. 704(a) and Discussion.
188
406 U.S. 441 (1972).
189
Id. at 453 (rejecting the argument that transactional immunity was
necessary to compel testimony).
190
Id. Examples of prohibited use include “the use of compelled testimony
as an ‘investigatory lead’” and “the use of any evidence obtained by focusing
investigation on a witness as a result of his compelled disclosures.” Id. at 460.
191
Id. The Court characterized this duty of proof as a “heavy burden.” Id. at
461.
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B. Iran-Contra
During the Reagan Administration, anti-tank missiles were sold
to Iran as part of an effort to secure the freedom of American
hostages held in Lebanon. However, some of the money from the
sale of the missiles was then used to support the Nicaraguan
Contra movement, in contravention of legal restrictions on
prohibiting such support.192 The resulting scandal, known as IranContra, directly involved at least two active duty officers, Vice
Admiral John Poindexter and Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North,
and two retired officers, Major General (Ret.) Ricard V. Secord
and Lieutenant Colonel (Ret.) Robert C. McFarlane.193
Placing a premium on public disclosure to the disadvantage of
parallel prosecutorial efforts, the congressional committee
investigating Iran-Contra granted immunity to twenty-one
witnesses,194 including Poindexter and North.195 Use immunity was
granted to Poindexter and North over the objections of the
Independent Counsel.196 The committee opted to grant immunity
because the Independent Counsel could not guarantee (1)
indictments before the committee’s term ended, (2) “that the
American people would ever hear from the two individuals who
knew most about what role President Reagan had played in the
192

WILLIAM S. COHEN & GEORGE J. MITCHELL, MEN OF ZEAL, A CANDID
INSIDE STORY OF THE IRAN-CONTRA HEARINGS 1, 11 (1988).
193
All Naval Academy graduates, North was an active duty Marine
Lieutenant Colonel and Poindexter was on duty as a Vice Admiral; McFarlane
had retired from the Marine Corps after twenty years of service. Id. at xv, 81. A
West Point graduate, Secord had retired as an Air Force Major General. Id. at
xvi, 68.
194
Id. at 39.
195
Id. at 41. Secord did not invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege against
self-incrimination and elected to testify without a grant of immunity. Id. at 65.
Similarly, McFarlane “neither sought nor received immunity for his testimony,
although he was under active investigation by Independent Counsel Walsh.” Id.
at 88. See also id. at 39-40 (concerned about “bring[ing] the full story to the
public . . . .”). See RUDMAN, supra note 50, at 150 (“whether or not they went to
jail was far less important than getting their testimony before the public . . . .”).
196
COHEN & MITCHELL, supra note 192, at 40-41.
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Iran weapons sale and Contra-aid programs,” and (3) that a trial
would even occur.197 However, recognizing the “heavy burden”
that a grant of immunity would place on the Independent Counsel’s
prosecutorial efforts, the committee agreed to delay seeking
immunized testimony in order to permit the Independent Counsel
to gather and insulate his evidence, protecting it from the taint of
the immunized testimony.198 Ultimately, the grant of immunity
proved catastrophic for the Independent Counsel’s prosecution
efforts.
Both North’s and Poindexter’s convictions were overturned,
not because of the improper exposure of the prosecutors to
immunized testimony, but because of the exposure of various
grand jury and trial witnesses to the immunized testimony.199 In
United States v. North,200 the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit viewed the Kastigar opinion as
requiring a “total ban on use” and explained further that “Kastigar
is . . . violated whenever the prosecution puts on a witness whose
testimony is shaped, directly or indirectly, by compelled testimony,
regardless of how or by whom he was exposed to that compelled
testimony.”201 Prohibited use occurs “if the immunized testimony
influenced the witness’s decision to testify” “even where the
witness testifies from personal knowledge . . . .”202 Further, the
court suggested that improper use occurs when “a witness’s
testimony ‘was motivated by’” immunized testimony.203 Finally,
the court made it clear that Kastigar was not satisfied merely by
197

Id.
Id. at 40-42.
199
Wright, supra note 187, at 425. Indeed, prosecutors avoided exposing
themselves to the immunized testimony by canceling newspaper subscriptions
and discontinued watching television. Id. Additionally, prior to the beginning of
the testimony, prosecutors filed completed witness interviews, and trial
memoranda of litigation strategy and investigative efforts with the court, and
took steps to avoid exposing the grand jury to the immunized testimony. Id.
200
920 F.2d 940 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
201
Id. at 941-42.
202
Id. at 942.
203
Id. In this case, “North’s immunized testimony motivated one witness,
Robert C. McFarlane, to expand upon his testimony.” Id. at 942 n.1.
198
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the prosecution “insulating itself from exposure to immunized
testimony.”204
Subsequently, in United States v. Poindexter,205 the D.C Circuit
emphasized that the Supreme Court in Kastigar prohibited any use
of compelled testimony.206 Further, the court determined that when
a witness, who has been exposed to immunized testimony, claims
that he or she cannot “segregate the effects of his exposure,” the
prosecution does not meet its burden of establishing evidence
independent of the immunized testimony “merely by pointing to
other statements of the same witness that were not themselves
shown to be untainted.”207 Although much of North’s testimony
was consistent with his congressional testimony, North’s testimony
at his own trial failed to meet the prosecution’s burden even
though “North’s testimony related to events he lived through and
of which he had personal knowledge without any reference to
Poindexter’s testimony.”208 This standard, the dissent argued,
permits a witness with a “well-timed case of amnesia” to allege
that he cannot separate his pre-exposure knowledge from what he
learned from the immunized testimony, and thus presumptively
taint his entire testimony.209
The North and Poindexter decisions create difficult hurdles for
prosecutors to surmount when there are high-visibility
congressional hearings involving immunized witnesses. In the
wake of the North decision, dissenting Chief Judge Wald of the
Second Circuit opined that the court had “rendered impossible in
virtually all cases the prosecution of persons whose immunized
204

Id. at 942.
951 F.2d 369 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
206
Id. at 373 (citing Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. at 462 (1972)).
207
Id. at 376. In the instant case, North alleged that he could not segregate
his own recollections from his exposure to Poindexter’s immunized testimony
before the select committee. Id. at 375. The trial judge did not believe North,
“reject[ing] Colonel North’s statement as ‘totally incredible.’” Id. at 389
(Mikva, C.J., dissenting).
208
Id. at 389 (Mikva, C.J., dissenting).
209
Id. at 390. See Wright, supra note 187, at 427 (“[A] hostile witness
might intentionally expose himself or herself to the immunized testimony,
hoping to make later testimony useless to the prosecution.”).
205

DAVIDSON MACROED.DOC

318

4/18/2006 12:37 PM

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

testimony is of such national significance as to be the subject of
congressional hearings and media coverage.”210 The North and
Poindexter decisions are particularly significant because, within
the federal system, “the D.C. Circuit is the appeals court most
likely to hear challenges to prosecutions in the wake of
congressional grants of immunity . . . .”211 Accordingly, as a result
of the North and Poindexter opinions, Congress has been less
inclined to grant immunity.212
C. The Effect of Congressional Immunity on the Military
Justice System
If a congressional committee were to immunize a military
witness, the military justice system would necessarily be required
to honor the associated witness protections.213 Because military
courts are not bound by decisions of the D.C. Circuit in North and
Poindexter, the scope of those protections would be determined by
military, rather than federal law. However, the military justice
system has generally elected to follow these two precedents.
The military’s immunity procedures, contained in R.C.M. 704,

210

United States v. North, 920 F.2d 940, 951-52 (2d. Cir. 1990).
Wright, supra note 187, at 419 (this is because “most of the executive
branch officials testifying before Congress (at least those witnesses valuable
enough to merit immunity) will live and work in Washington.”). Id. at 419 n.49.
212
Giuffra, supra note 39, at *2 (“The decisions of the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia reversing the convictions of Mr. North and
Mr. Poindexter have made it less likely that congressional committees will vote
to grant immunity.”); Wright, supra note 187, at 431 (“Anecdotal evidence
suggests that the North and Poindexter decisions have discouraged
congressional committees from using immunities in particular cases . . . .”); cf.
Abramson, supra note 184 (“several senators on the panel [investigating
campaign finance irregularities] have expressed unease about creating
impediments to subsequent prosecutions,” noting the effect of immunity grants
from the Iran-Contra hearings).
213
See United States v. Allen, 59 M.J. 478, 482 (2004) (“A grant of
immunity by one jurisdiction within the federal structure, such as a State,
provides equivalent protections against use of the information by other
jurisdictions, such as another State or the Federal Government.”).
211
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are consistent with the federal practice.214 Compliant with
Kastigar, military law prohibits the prosecution from using
compelled testimony against an immunized service member,215
except for perjury, false swearing, false statements, and the refusal
to obey an order to testify.216 Significantly, the military follows
those federal courts that have extended Kastigar’s use prohibition
to “include non-evidentiary use such as the decision to
prosecute.”217 Further, following the precedent established by
North, military case law prohibits the Government from using “the
testimony of a witness which was influenced by the immunized
testimony.”218
As with federal prosecutors, military trial counsel bears the
“heavy burden” of establishing “non-use of immunized
testimony.”219 The United States must “show that it has not used in
any way for the prosecution of that person the person’s statements,
testimony, or information derived from them.”220 The immunized
214

See United States v. Mapes, 59 M.J. 60, 66 (2003) (noting that the
military’s immunity procedure is “[c]onsistent with [the] federal practice . . . .”);
United States v. Olivero, 39 M.J. 246, 250 (C.M.A. 1994) (“R.C.M. 704(b) is
based on 18 U.S.C. § 6002.”).
215
Mapes, 59 M.J. at 67.
216
See MCM, supra note 41, R.C.M. 704(b)(1) & (2); Mil. R. Evid.
301(c)(1). See Olivero, 39 M.J. at 250 (perjury). Similarly, in the federal system,
an immunized witness may still be prosecuted for perjury or making false
statements before a congressional committee. See Giuffra, supra note 39, at *3.
In the military, a service member may also be subject to court-martial for the
failure to obey an order to testify after being immunized. MCM, supra note 41,
R.C.M. 704(b)(1).
217
Mapes, 59 M.J. at 67. See also Olivero, 39 M.J. at 249; United States v.
Allen, 59 M.J. 478, 482 (C.A.A.F. 2004) (“may not rely upon or use immunized
testimony in making the decision to prosecute.”).
218
Mapes, 59 M.J. at 67. See also United States v. Youngman, 48 M.J. 123,
127 (1998).
219
Mapes, 59 M.J. at 67-68. See also MCM, supra note 41, R.C.M. 704(a),
Discussion (“heavy burden”).
220
MCM, supra note 41, R.C.M. 704(a), Discussion. See also Allen, 59
M.J. at 482 (“The burden is upon the Government in such a case to demonstrate
‘by a preponderance of the evidence, that the prosecutorial decision was
untainted by the immunized testimony.’”).
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witness, and the United States, “should be left ‘in substantially the
same position as if the witness had claimed [the] privilege [against
self-incrimination].’”221
Traditionally, prosecutors have attempted to meet their burden
by “canning” or recording testimony of important witnesses prior
to receipt of immunized testimony or other evidence.222 This may
be difficult when such witnesses have not yet been identified,
refuse to be interviewed, or invoke their Fifth Amendment rights to
silence or against self-incrimination.223 The problem is aggravated
when immunized witnesses participate in media intensive
investigations or cases, including high-profile congressional
investigations.224
Military prosecutors will have a particularly difficult time
controlling witnesses’ exposure to immunized witnesses appearing
before congressional investigations that are televised or otherwise
extensively covered by the media. Assuming that the military
could, or would, order key military witnesses not to expose
themselves to television or newspapers, implementation of such an
order would prove problematic. Exposure could be either
inadvertent or prove necessary for co-accused to assist themselves
in preparation of a defense. Further, military commanders could
not order key civilian witnesses to avoid watching television, read
the newspapers, or expose themselves to other media forms.
Finally, the potential for an obstruction of justice charge against
civilian or military witnesses who deliberately exposed themselves
to immunized testimony as a means of regulating witness exposure
is uncertain at best. Such cases are difficult to prove,225 and, for
civilian witnesses, the military would suffer the additional burden
221

Allen, 59 M.J. at 482.
Wright, supra note 187, at 426.
223
Id.
224
Id. at 427.
225
“[I]t would be most difficult for a prosecutor to prove that the defendant
witness exposed himself or herself to the testimony with the purpose of
obstructing the criminal proceedings. Most witnesses will have many legitimate
reasons, including the curiosity shared by most citizens, for listening to the
congressional testimony.” Id.
222
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of having to convince the DOJ to prosecute the case.
IV. THE STATUS OF COMMON LAW PRIVILEGES AFTER COMPELLED
WAIVER DURING A CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION
As discussed in Part I, Congress is not bound by common law
privileges and may compel both testimony and evidence over
privilege objections. The legal status of otherwise privileged
material in subsequent criminal proceedings remains uncertain.
Recent cigarette product liability cases illustrates this area of legal
uncertainty.
The litigation involved several state lawsuits against the
cigarette industry for recovery of Medicaid costs attributed by the
states to the effects of cigarette smoking, and a concomitant effort
seeking federal legislation that would facilitate a nation-wide
settlement of the litigation.226 While many of these lawsuits were
progressing, Chairman Bailey of the House Committee on
Commerce issued subpoenas to the tobacco companies, which
were complied with after the companies were notified that the
Committee would overrule any assertion of privilege.227 At least
one law firm received a letter from Chairman Bailey in which he
threatened to initiate contempt proceedings if the documents were
not produced.228 The companies asserted that many of these
documents sought by Congress were subject to the attorney-client
privilege and to the protections of the work product doctrine.229
However, a Minnesota state court had previously determined that
the same documents were either not privileged, or were subject to
the crime fraud exception.230 Subsequently, the Committee
“released the documents to the press and the public via the

226

Commonwealth v. Philip Morris, Inc., No. 957378J, 1998 WL 1248003,
at *1 (Mass. Super. July 30, 1998).
227
Id. at *1-2. See also Reilly, supra note 54.
228
Reilly, supra note 54, at 51.
229
Id. at 50.
230
Id. at 51 (citing State of Minnesota v. Phillip Morris Inc., 1998 WL
257214 (Minn. Dist. Ct.)).
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Internet.”231 The Minnesota case settled and plaintiffs moved for
disclosure of the documents, which the court permitted.232
In at least twenty-six cases, plaintiffs sought court
determinations that the tobacco companies had waived their claim
to asserting a privilege over these documents.233 Nineteen courts
found a waiver; seven courts did not.234 Of the nineteen courts
finding a waiver, ten courts expressly relied on the document
production in response to the Congressional subpoena, but
“[s]even courts expressly rejected waiver on this ground . . . .”235
In Iron Workers Local Union No. 17 Insurance Fund v. Philip
Morris, Inc.,236 the court determined that the defendants waived
any privilege by virtue of the Minnesota state court consent decree
and by producing the documents to Congress.237 With regard to the
production of documents in response to the congressional
subpoena, the court posited that “a party must do more than merely
object to Congress’s ruling. Instead, a party must risk standing in
contempt of Congress.”238 In the instant case, the court found that
the defendants “did not exhaust all remedies available for
maintaining a claim of privilege,” such as meeting with the
Chairman or other committee members, filing a legal
memorandum containing the factual and legal basis for their
privilege assertion, submitting a privilege log, or requesting a
hearing.239
In comparison, in International Union of Operating Engineers,
231

Philip Morris, Inc., 1998 WL 1248003, at *2. See Reilly, supra note 54,

at 50.
232

Reilly, supra note 54, at 51. Over defendants’ privilege claims, the
Minnesota appellate system affirmed the trial judge’s disclosure authorization.
Id. The consent judgment contained a provision permitting “plaintiffs in that
case [to] ‘seek court approval’ to place privileged documents in a public
document depository.” Id.
233
Id. at 55.
234
Id.
235
Id. at 56.
236
35 F. Supp. 2d 582 (N.D. Ohio 1999).
237
Id. at 594, 596.
238
Id. at 595.
239
Id.
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Local No. 132, Health and Welfare Fund v. Phillip Morris Inc.,240
a Magistrate Judge rejected plaintiff’s argument that disclosure to
Congress pursuant to Chairman Bailey’s subpoena waived
defendants’ attorney-client privilege over such documents. The
Magistrate Judge first noted “[a]s an initial matter, the involuntary
or compelled production of privileged or protected documents does
not waive otherwise applicable claims of privilege or protection so
long as the privilege holder objects and takes reasonable steps to
protect its claims of privilege and protection.”241 Reviewing the
same facts as did the court in Iron Workers, the Magistrate Judge
determined that defendants “took the reasonable steps required to
prevent their compliance from resulting in a waiver.”242 Further,
defendants were “not required to stand in contempt” to preserve
the privilege claims.243
The sparse military case law that exists would appear to allow
the invocation of common law privileges, and preclude the
admission of otherwise privileged information at courts-martial,
when a congressional committee forces disclosure of privileged
information. As a general rule, a grant of immunity does not
automatically result in a waiver of common law privileges,
particularly the attorney-client privilege.244 Further, the compelled
waiver of the attorney-client privilege in one proceeding has been
held not to effect the ability to invoke the privilege in a subsequent
proceeding.245
240

No. CIV.A. 3:97-0708, 1999 WL 33659387 (S.D. W. Va. June 28,
1999) (Hogg, M.J.).
241
Id. at *5 (citing United States v. de la Jara, 973 F.2d 746, 749 (9th Cir.
1992)); Shields v. Sturm Ruger & Co., 864 F.2d 379, 382 (5th Cir. 1989).
242
Id. at *7.
243
Id.
244
United States v. Vanderbilt, 58 M.J. 725 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. 2003)
(citing United States v. Brunious, 49 C.M.R. 102, 104 (N.M.C.M.R. 1974)). See
also United States v. Fair, 10 C.M.R. 19, 26, 2 U.S.C.M.A. 521, 538 (C.M.A.
1953) (grant of immunity from prosecution did not preclude soldier from
invoking attorney-client privilege).
245
See United States v. Romano, 43 M.J. 523 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 1995),
rev’d. 46 M.J. 269 (1997); MCM, supra note 41, Mil. R. Evid. 510(b) (“Unless
testifying voluntarily concerning a privileged matter or communication, an
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In United States v. Romano, a female airman, who was alleged
to have fraternized with the accused officer, testified at his courtmartial pursuant to a grant of immunity.246 During crossexamination, Airman Mucci was asked about a statement she had
made to her attorney in which she denied dating the accused,
Lieutenant Romano.247 The statement had been made by Mucci
while testifying as a government witness during an unrelated
Article 32 hearing involving a different defendant.248 Following an
objection by the military prosecutor, the trial judge sustained the
objection, concluding that Mucci had not voluntarily waived her
attorney-client privilege during the earlier proceeding because she
had testified under a grant of immunity and denied defense
counsel’s request to cross-examine Mucci about the statement.249
On appeal, the court agreed with the trial judge, positing that
“compelled testimony resulting from a grant of testimonial
immunity at an Article 32 [hearing] is not a voluntary waiver.”250
The appellate court relied on Military Rule of Evidence 510(b),
which provides in relevant part: “[A]n accused who testifies
[o]n . . . her own behalf . . . under a grant or promise of immunity
does not, merely by reason of testifying, waive a privilege to
which . . . she may be entitled pertaining to the confidential matter
or communication.”251
accused who testifies in his or her own behalf or a person who testifies under a
grant or promise of immunity does not, merely by reason of testifying, waive a
privilege to which he or she may be entitled pertaining to the confidential matter
or communication.”).
246
Romano, 43 M.J. at 526.
247
Id. at 528.
248
Id. at 525-26. An Article 32 hearing is a pretrial investigation of charges
against a military accused (defendant). It is loosely analogous to a grand jury
proceeding. See 10 U.S.C. § 832. Unlike a grand jury, the accused may appear
with counsel, cross-examine witnesses and present his own evidence. Id.
249
Romano, 46 M.J. at 272.
250
Id. at 274.
251
Id. (quoting Mil. R. Evid. 510(b)). However, the court left unresolved
the possibility that “[t]he defense’s constitutional right to produce evidence
under the compulsory process clause may overcome the attorney-client
privilege.” Id.
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CONCLUSION
Congress enjoys both the right and duty to conduct
investigations into matters within its legislative sphere. Further, it
is a key participant in bringing matters of national significance to
the attention of the American public. When investigating matters
that involve individual criminal misconduct, however, Congress’s
rights and responsibilities may adversely impact the Executive
Branch’s ability to prosecute such misconduct. This impact is most
keenly felt by the criminal justice system when Congress grants a
witness use immunity and that witness’s testimony is either
televised or widely reported by the media. The immunity granted
to Admiral Poindexter and Lieutenant Colonel North during the
Iran-Contra investigation stands as a stark reminder of the
potentially devastating effect immunity grants can have on
subsequent or parallel prosecution efforts.
The armed forces are frequently the object of Congressional
inquiry. Further, as exemplified by the Congressional
investigations into the My Lai massacre and the Iran-Contra
scandal, active duty members of the military are occasionally the
object of Congressional scrutiny. As with its federal counterpart,
the military justice system is similarly affected by congressional
investigations and grants of immunity.
Since Iran-Contra, Congress has exhibited an increased
reluctance to granting immunity, wisely balancing its investigatory
desires against the needs of the criminal justice system.252 In the
future, as long as the Department of Defense shows that it is
capable of conducting thorough and credible investigations of
individual misconduct within its ranks—as it did following My Lai
and Abu Ghraib253—Congress should continue to stay its hand and
252

See Wright, supra note 187 (“Anecdotal evidence suggests that the
North and Poindexter decisions have discouraged congressional committees
from using immunities in particular cases . . . .”).
253
See THE ABU GHRAIB INVESTIGATIONS: THE OFFICIAL REPORTS OF THE
INDEPENDENT PANEL AND THE PENTAGON ON THE SHOCKING PRISONER ABUSE
IN IRAQ (ed. Steven Strasser, 2004) (containing Major General George R. Fay’s
report entitled “Investigation Of The Abu Ghraib Detention Facility And 205th
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permit the military to investigate and, if appropriate, bring to
justice those individual service members who have engaged in
criminal misconduct.254
Military Intelligence Brigade”); Bradley Graham & Thomas E. Ricks,
Leadership Failure Is Blamed In Abuse, WASH. POST, May 12, 2004, at A1, A19
(investigation conducted by Army Major General Antonio Taguba, consisting of
some 6,000 pages, “drew praise from members of both parties for a thorough
and objective inquiry into the mistreatment”). See also Josh White & R. Jeffrey
Smith, Abuse Review Exonerates Policy, WASH. POST, Mar. 10, 2005, at A16
(“Pentagon’s widest-ranging examination of prisoner abuse . . .”). But cf. Josh
White, Rights Groups Reject Prison Abuse Findings, WASH. POST, Apr. 24,
2005, at A20 (Human rights group “assailed the Army’s findings that top
generals in Iraq should bear no official responsibility for abuse at the Abu
Ghraib prison . . . .”); Michael Hirsch & John Barry, The Abu Ghraib Scandal
Cover-up?, NEWSWEEK, June 7, 2004, at 35 (critics charge “that the current
probes are still too limited to bring full accountability”); White & Graham,
supra note 2, at A17 (“Senators expressed dismay . . . that no senior military or
civilian Pentagon officials have been held accountable for the policy and
command failures that led to detainee abuse in Iraq and Afghanistan . . . .”).
254
In the wake of the Abu Ghraib detainee abuse scandal, the Army has
successfully prosecuted several soldiers for related misconduct. See Graner
Verdict May Alter Davis Defense, ASBURY PARK PRESS (New Jersey), Jan. 17,
2005, at A6 (Army jury rejects superior orders defense, convicts Army
Specialist of five charges and sentences him to ten years in jail); Douglas Jehl,
G.I. In Abu Ghraib Abuse Is Spared Time In Jail, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 2004, at
A15 (Army Private “pleaded guilty to a single charge of dereliction of
duty . . .”); Jackie Spinner, MP Gets 8 Years For Iraq Abuse, WASH. POST, Oct.
22, 2004 (Army Staff Sergeant, “the highest-ranking of eight soldiers charged
with abusing detainees at Abu Ghraib prison, was sentenced to eight years in
prison . . . “); Jackie Spinner, Soldier Pleads Guilty To Prisoner Abuse, WASH.
POST, Sept. 12, 2004, at A24 (Army Specialist “pleaded guilty to two charges of
conspiracy and maltreatment of detainees at the prison”); Sharon Behn, Soldier
Guilty Of Abuse At Iraq Prison, WASH. TIMES, May 20, 2004, at A1 (Army
Specialist found guilty of four counts of abuse and sentenced to a year in jail). In
addition to courts-martial, the Army administratively punished several officers.
See Josh White, General Demoted, But Cleared In Abuse Probe, WASH. POST,
May 6, 2005, at A8; Thom Shanker & Dexter Filkins, Army Punishes 7 With
Reprimands For Prison Abuse, N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 2004. Other branches of the
military have also taken action for misconduct against detainees or prisoners.
See e.g., A Roll Call of Recent Abuse Cases, WASH. POST, Jan. 16, 2005, at A9
(two Marines convicted of prisoner abuse-related charges at Camp Whitehorse,
Iraq); SEAL Acquitted in Prisoner’s Death, WASH. POST, Dec. 21, 2004, at A9
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(one SEAL acquitted, but another determined to have assaulted a prisoner during
Captain’s Mast, a nonjudicial proceeding); Swell Chan, Marine Sergeant To
Face Court-Martial In Abuse, WASH. POST, June 12, 2004, at A18 (two Marines
convicted and two more pending charges for giving electric shocks to an Iraqi
prisoner at a temporary detention facility).

